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INTRODUCTION 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) has been adopted in for-
ty-six states1 over its thirty year existence.  Uniform laws like the UTSA 
serve at least two important purposes.  First, they provide a consistent 
set of rules to provide settled expectations for interstate activities.  The 
Uniform Commercial Code and Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act are good examples of this purpose.  Buyers, sellers, and parents 
cannot avoid important legal rules by changing states, therefore help-
ing to reduce forum shopping.  Second, uniform laws allow state legis-
lators to adopt sister-state statutory interpretations when they enact 
the law.  The UTSA illustrates this purpose.2  Each state’s UTSA case 
law should theoretically apply in every other state adopting it—an im-
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1 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3:29 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-22-8 (LexisNexis 2010) (stating that the West 
Virginia Trade Secrets Act “shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act among states 
enacting it”).  The UTSA also provides consistent rules for interstate commerce, espe-
cially for employers with employees in multiple states. 
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portant benefit for small states that do not have enough litigation ac-
tivity to generate substantial trade secret case law of their own.3 
Testing how well the UTSA serves as a source of extraterritorial 
precedent is difficult, however.  First, many states had their own trade 
secret common law to draw on prior to passage of the UTSA.  Second, 
even if a court uses persuasive authority from another state, the court 
might then further shape the law to its liking.  Third, measuring the 
impact of extraterritorial precedent is difficult because judicial opi-
nions might import law on some issues and not on others. 
West Virginia’s UTSA experience provides an answer to these 
measurement difficulties.  An examination of West Virginia law reveals 
a curious fact:  a complete absence of state court trade secret case law, 
both before and after passage of the UTSA.  This characteristic makes 
West Virginia the perfect test case of a small state with insufficient liti-
gation activity to generate its own trade secret law. 
The dearth of trade secret opinions may seem surprising because 
West Virginia plaintiffs are no shrinking violets.  While the state has an 
undeserved reputation for proplaintiff litigation,4 plaintiffs are cer-
tainly willing and able to file trade secret misappropriation lawsuits. 
However, the absence of judicial opinions is not necessarily sur-
prising.  West Virginia has no mandatory appellate court; all appeal 
requests are made to the Supreme Court of West Virginia, which has 
discretionary jurisdiction.5  As a result, if the West Virginia Supreme 
Court does not hear any trade secret cases, then there will be no state 
court decisions interpreting the statute.6 
Despite a lack of state supreme court guidance, trade secret cases 
are adjudicated in West Virginia.  The interesting uniformity question 
is whether lower courts in West Virginia rely on extraterritorial judi-
cial decisions for guidance and whether such guidance is based on the 
UTSA. 
Thus, West Virginia provides a natural experiment to test the role 
of the UTSA in providing uniformity because there is no cross conta-
 
3 Such uniform laws are not without their costs.  To the extent that different states 
implement their laws differently, each state might need to consider additional infor-
mation to sort out how it will enforce the law. 
4 See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social 
Science:  Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097, 1122-26 (2008) (pointing 
out that very few West Virginia small businesses have been sued in the past ten years, 
and that even fewer were subject to “frivolous” suits). 
5 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-5-1 (LexisNexis 2010). 
6 As discussed below, West Virginia trial court opinions are not published or oth-
erwise readily available. 
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mination of authority by West Virginia precedent.  This Essay meas-
ures how West Virginia federal courts use the UTSA and the case law 
of other states to make legal decisions.  It then reports the empirical 
results of this experiment and discusses how we might learn from it.  
This Essay is the first foray into this question; ongoing work will consid-
er federal law from every UTSA state.  However, West Virginia’s natural 
experiment makes the initial question worth considering on its own. 
Part I discusses application of the law in West Virginia’s state and 
federal courts.  Despite nearly twenty-five years under the UTSA, not a 
single state court decision has been issued applying or interpreting 
the statute.  Furthermore, there are virtually no common law trade se-
cret opinions available. 
Part II describes the experiment that West Virginia’s lack of state 
precedent allows.  Federal courts in West Virginia have considered 
trade secret issues, and the lack of state authorities forces them to 
look to out-of-state authorities.  This Essay examines whether courts 
considered out-of-state authorities and if so, which. 
Part III describes the results of the analysis.  In short, West Virgin-
ia federal courts do not look to UTSA cases from other states, or even 
state court decisions in other states.  Instead, they tend to rely on fed-
eral precedent based on older common law trade secret principles. 
Part IV discusses the implications of these findings for the un-
iformity of trade secret law.  While there may be uniformity in the ap-
plication of law, such uniformity does not appear to emanate from the 
UTSA, but instead from application of common law principles that 
the UTSA supposedly displaced.7  Further, cases that do not directly 
confront trade secret misappropriation are poor sources of interpreta-
tion of the UTSA. 
The Essay concludes by discussing the implications of this study 
on uniform statutes in general, and discusses the next avenue of re-
search to answer important questions about the role of uniform laws. 
I.  TRADE SECRETS IN WEST VIRGINIA 
A.  Adoption of the UTSA 
West Virginia was a relatively early adopter of the UTSA.  The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws first pro-
 
7 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-22-7 (LexisNexis 2010) (“[T]his article displaces con-
flicting tort, restitutionary and other law of this state providing civil remedies for mi-
sappropriation of a trade secret.”). 
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posed the UTSA in 1979 and a revision in 1985.8  West Virginia 
adopted the UTSA in 1986;9 it was the ninth state to do so.10 
West Virginia’s version of the statute varies slightly from the Uni-
form Act.  The primary difference relates to damages.  The Uniform 
Act allows both actual damages and disgorgement of the misappro-
priator’s profit, but limits disgorgement to an amount that fully com-
pensates the trade secret owner.11  West Virginia’s implementation, 
however, allows both actual damages and disgorgement without limit.  
Though this change might fuel a negative perception of West Virginia 
as a plaintiff’s haven,12 allowing heightened unjust enrichment dis-
gorgement may actually be a more efficient rule that serves to discou-
rage trade secret misappropriation.13 
B.  State Case Law 
Searches for “trade secret(s)” in both Lexis and Westlaw reveal 
several opinions by the West Virginia Supreme Court.  However, none 
of these cases relates to a claim of trade secret misappropriation.  
Each of the reported cases, both before and after the passage of the 
UTSA, relates to trade secrets in collateral form:14  noncompetition 
agreements,15 Freedom of Information Act requests,16 protective or-
 
8 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (Supp. 2006). 
9 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-22 (LexisNexis 2010); Lisa A. Jarr, Note, West Virginia 
Trade Secrets in the 21st Century:  West Virginia’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 
525, 526 (1995). 
10 JAGER, supra note 1, at app. A2. 
11 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3, 14 U.L.A. 529 (Supp. 2006). 
12 See generally Thornburg, supra note 4, at 1100-03 (documenting West Virginia’s 
reputation as a “hellhole” for tort defendants). 
13 See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
1, 59 (2007) (“[T]he law disgorges the additional benefit in order to reduce the com-
petitor’s incentive to focus more resources on appropriation.”). 
14 See Risch, supra note 13, at 19-21 (describing cases in which trade secrets were 
treated as “collateral property”—i.e., where defining a trade secret as property trig-
gered a constitutional or statutory right). 
15 See, e.g., Wood v. Accordia of W. Va., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 2005); Hun-
tington Eye Assocs., Inc. v. LoCascio, 553 S.E.2d 773 (W. Va. 2001); Cutright v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 491 S.E.2d 308 (W. Va. 1997); Weaver v. Ritchie, 478 S.E.2d 363 (W. Va. 
1996); Voorhees v. Guyan Mach. Co., 446 S.E.2d 672 (W. Va. 1994); Moore Bus. Forms, 
Inc. v. Foppiano, 382 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1989); Appalachian Labs., Inc. v. Bostic, 359 
S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 1987) (per curiam); Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 
314 S.E.2d 166 (W. Va. 1983) (pre-UTSA); Helms Boys, Inc. v. Brady, 297 S.E.2d 840 
(W. Va. 1982); Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found’n of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1982) 
(pre-UTSA); Envtl. Prods. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1981) (pre-
UTSA); PEMCO Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1979) (pre-UTSA); Household 
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ders,17 and other disputes.18  None of these collateral rulings settles a 
disputed question of law about West Virginia’s trade secret statute.  
Instead, these cases primarily settle questions of law about the under-
lying dispute or factual questions about whether a particular piece of 
information is a trade secret. 
While trade secret questions have arisen, a court’s statements 
about trade secret law in collateral cases are not terribly helpful as 
precedent for the lower courts of a state.  First, the rhetoric in colla-
teral cases might favor a stronger view of trade secrets than the court 
might apply when misappropriation damages are at stake.19  For ex-
ample, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the United States Supreme 
Court interpreted trade secret law as creating a property interest sub-
ject to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause,20 despite a running 
scholarly debate about whether trade secrets are truly property—a de-
bate that might be best resolved by individual state courts.21 
Second, such collateral cases rarely delve into the factual ques-
tions that often animate close questions of trade secret law, such as 
whether information is “readily ascertainable.”  Instead, decisions 
tend to focus on the broad definition of a trade secret and anything 
close to that definition qualifies for protection.  For example, in the 
 
Fin. Corp. v. Sutton, 43 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1947) (pre-UTSA); Hommel Co. v. Fink, 
177 S.E. 619 (W. Va. 1934) (pre-UTSA). 
16 See, e.g., State ex rel. Brooks v. Zakaib, 609 S.E.2d 861 (W. Va. 2004); Daily Ga-
zette Co. v. W. Va. Dev. Office, 482 S.E.2d 180 (W. Va. 1996); AT&T Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 423 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1992); Queen v. W. Va. Univ. 
Hosps., Inc., 365 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1987);  see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29B-1-4(a)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2010) (exempting trade secrets from the West Virginia Freedom of Infor-
mation Act provisions). 
17 See, e.g., Lovell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 584 S.E.2d 553 (W. Va. 2003); State 
ex rel. Westbrook Health Servs., Inc. v. Hill, 550 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 2001); Keplinger v. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 537 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va. 2000); State ex rel. Garden State News-
papers, Inc. v. Hoke, 520 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va. 1999); State ex rel. W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Karl, 505 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1998); Bartles v. Hinkle, 472 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1996); 
State ex rel. Arrow Concrete Co. v. Hill, 460 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1995); State ex rel. 
Shroades v. Henry, 421 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992); State ex rel. Johnson v. Tsapis, 419 
S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1992); Veltri v. Charleston Urban Renewal Auth., 363 S.E.2d 746 (W. 
Va. 1987); State ex rel. McGraw v. W. Va. Judicial Review Bd., 264 S.E.2d 168 (W. Va. 
1980) (pre-UTSA). 
18 See, e.g., Barlow v. Hester Indus., 479 S.E.2d 628, 634-35 (W. Va. 1996) (affirm-
ing that an employee did not breach a confidentiality agreement in a discrimination 
case in which the employer counterclaimed that the employee divulged company trade 
secrets). 
19 See Risch, supra note 13, at 19-20 (arguing that the definition of trade secrets 
matters more when damages are at issue). 
20 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). 
21 See Risch, supra note 13, at 20-21 (discussing the differing conceptions of trade 
secrets, and information generally, as property). 
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post-UTSA case State ex rel. Johnson v. Tsapis,22 the West Virginia Su-
preme Court referred to a 1975 Southern District of New York case23 
to determine whether allegedly confidential information should be 
protected in litigation discovery.24  The 1975 case, in turn, relied on 
Section 757 of the First Restatement of Torts,25 which was the primary 
pre-UTSA trade secret law.  The UTSA was not completed until 1979, 
and New York still has not enacted it. 
The question is why the Tsapis court eschewed sister-state UTSA 
law in favor of a preempted26 definition of trade secret that is margi-
nally different from the UTSA definition.27  The likely answer is sim-
ple:  the choice of common law interpretation did not matter and the 
Restatement definition was close enough for the purposes facing the 
court.  The parties may not have even briefed the UTSA issues.  Had 
the parties been litigating misappropriation related to subjects where 
the Restatement differs from the UTSA, the court may well have 
looked to sister-state UTSA decisions.  Courts will not always fail to 
consider the appropriate law in collateral cases;28 however, even when 
they do so, they are considering only one sliver of trade secret law. 
It is unclear whether the lack of trade secret opinions is due to a 
lack of litigated disputes or a lack of interest by the West Virginia Su-
preme Court.  A cursory review implies that the answer is unlikely to 
be a lack of court interest.  First, Petitions for Appeal dating to 2000 
reveal only a single request to consider a trade secret misappropria-
tion issue, but the case was resolved on other grounds.29  A second 
 
22 419 S.E.2d 1, 3 (W. Va.1992). 
23 United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
24 Tsapis, 419 S.E.2d at 3. 
25 Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. at 46-47. 
26 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-22-7 (LexisNexis 2010) (preempting all common law 
trade secret definitions).  To be fair, this section only applies to trade secret misappro-
priation actions, and Tsapis related to a discovery dispute. 
27 Risch, supra note 13, at 8 (describing differences between UTSA and Restate-
ment definitions of trade secrets). 
28 See, e.g., O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 112-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (criticizing property-like protection for trade secrets in a discovery matter). 
29 Appellant Brief of A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. at 64, A.T. Massey Coal Co., v. Ca-
perton, 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 33350) (“[T]he dispute at issue does not 
involve trade secrets . . . and as such, there was no need for the court to offer instruc-
tions on trade secrets . . . .”).  Interestingly, this case was recently decided by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court regarding the duty of elected judges to recuse.  Caperton v. 
A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).  On remand, Caperton was 
finally reversed on procedural grounds and the judgment, which relies in part on trade 
secret misappropriation, was not reviewed.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,, 690 
S.E.2d 322, 328 (W. Va. 2009). 
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case involved a trade secret dispute appealed on other grounds, and 
in that case, too, the lower court’s order was reversed on procedural 
grounds.30  The West Virginia Supreme Court maintains a published 
list of issues considered during conferences where the justices vote on 
petitions for review, dating back to 1998.  That list of issues reveals no 
other petition relating to trade secret misappropriation. 
Additionally, the court has taken several cases with collateral trade 
secret issues, implying that if unsettled trade secret questions were 
presented, such questions would get consideration.  For example, a 
recent case involved retention of business records, but the court de-
cided the issue based on agency.31  Additionally, the court agreed to 
hear a case relating to breach of contractual confidentiality provi-
sions,32 though the case later settled prior to hearing.  Finally, neither 
a former justice (term 1996–2008) nor the court clerk (who joined 
the court in 1998) could recall any petition primarily relating to theft 
of trade secrets.33 
The absence of requests for review despite the existence of busi-
ness litigation is interesting.  Because the cost of filing a petition is 
relatively low, one would expect that the losing party in a trade secret 
case of any value would file such a petition.  There is also no reason to 
believe that differences from the Uniform Act affect the number or 
type of cases brought in West Virginia.  Differences from the Uniform 
Act are common,34 and West Virginia’s implementation has not re-
ceived any publicity.  Further, given that the modifications increase 
the amount of damages available, one would expect the differences to 
encourage rather than discourage trade secret litigation. 
Some might argue that the state has an undeveloped information-
based economy and, therefore, employees and competitors have no 
valuable information to misappropriate.  This explanation is unlikely 
for a variety of reasons. 
 
30 Rashid v. Tarakji, 674 S.E.2d 1, 4 (W. Va. 2008). 
31 Timberline Four Seasons Resort Mgmt. Co. v. Herlan, 679 S.E.2d 329, 338 (W. 
Va. 2009). 
32 See Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Motion Docket, May 22, 2007, 
available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/calendar/may22_07md.htm (accepting ap-
peal in Eagle Research Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 070374). 
33 Telephone Interviews with Rory Perry, Clerk of Court, in Morgantown, W. Va. 
(2009–2010); interviews with the Hon. Larry V. Starcher (ret.), in Morgantown, W. Va. 
(2009–2010).   
34 See Risch, supra note 13, at 54 (discussing California’s rule regarding “readily 
ascertainable” information); Jarr, supra note 9, at 544-45 (noting changes to uniform 
code in West Virginia’s implementation). 
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First, evidence implies that there are at least some trade secret 
cases in West Virginia.  As noted above, two appeals involved cases 
with at least one trade secret misappropriation claim.  Further, at least 
one trade secret case was reported on by the defendant, the Pittsburgh 
Post-Gazette.35  Other state filings have been reported as well.36  Unfor-
tunately, little additional data could be gathered with any efficiency.  
The circuit courts in West Virginia do not keep any electronic record of 
the types of cases before them, and the state’s supreme court has no 
comprehensive electronic (or other) record of cases heard prior to 2000. 
Second, there have been several trade secret cases heard in federal 
court.  This implies that there are trade secret cases at the state level that 
do not involve diversity jurisdiction or pendant claims in federal question 
cases involving, for example, copyright or patent infringement. 
Third, an inability to find trade secret cases does not mean that 
they do not exist.  For example, Professor Lerner’s study of trade se-
cret litigation in California revealed 199 final court decisions from 
1990–2006.37  One would expect there to have been many more such 
cases in California over that period of time.  For example, the author 
was personally involved in at least twenty California cases including at 
least one trade secret claim from 1998–2007, nearly ten percent of the 
total reported decisions in far less time.38  Most of these cases settled 
without any final decision, and only one case resulted in an appellate 
opinion relating to trade secrecy, despite the presence of an appellate 
court with mandatory jurisdiction. Using a similar ratio, a single appel-
late opinion in West Virginia may represent twenty cases, or even 
more, given West Virginia’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction. 
Fourth, perhaps the best explanation is that trade secret misap-
propriation cases have not been particularly necessary.  One norma-
tive justification for the enforcement of noncompetition agreements is 
that they reduce the costs of enforcing trade secret misappropriation 
 
35 Teresa F. Lindeman, Mylan Inc. Files Suit Against the Post-Gazette, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2009, at A1; see also Jeffrey V. Mehalic, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
Responds to Mylan Suit, W. VA. BUS. LITIG., Sept. 30, 2009, 
http://www.wvbusinesslitigationblog.com/articles/intellectual-property (discussing 
the Post-Gazette’s response to Mylan’s  complaint). 
36 See Complaint at 3-5, Job Squad, Inc. v. Champion Indus., No. 08-C-1123 (W.Va. 
Cir. Ct., June 10, 2008) (alleging misappropriation of a company’s confidential information).  
37 Josh Lerner, Using Litigation to Understand Trade Secrets:  A Preliminary Exploration 
20 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=922520. 
38 Id. 
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claims where defining tacit knowledge is difficult.39  As a result, Profes-
sor Gilson posits that noncompete agreements reduce the need to de-
termine trade secret misappropriation.40  Given that the court has de-
cided several restrictive covenant cases, noncompete agreements may 
be the preferred mode of protecting trade secrets in West Virginia, 
rendering misappropriation litigation unnecessary.41 
II.  A NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
West Virginia provides a rare opportunity to examine the extrater-
ritorial effects of a uniform law.  Because the West Virginia Supreme 
Court has not interpreted the UTSA, the primary—and perhaps on-
ly—guidance available to lower courts comes from other jurisdictions. 
Thus, studying how West Virginia courts apply trade secret law in 
the absence of guidance from the state’s supreme court might provide 
valuable information about the UTSA.  For example, its code provi-
sions may be self-revealing, such that appellate guidance is unneces-
sary.  Alternatively, the courts of other states may provide guidance as 
to how particular code sections should be interpreted. 
A.  The Data:  Federal Application of the UTSA 
Inaccessible data makes a study of lower state court decisions diffi-
cult, but federal courts are a useful substitute.  Federal courts must 
apply state law, and trade secret law is a state question.42  West Virgin-
ia’s federal courts must look somewhere for guidance in the absence of 
any state judicial authority at any level.  The source of guidance for 
 
39 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 360 (2003) (“Such covenants . . . are a common device 
for protecting trade secrets because it is easier to determine whether a former em-
ployee is competing with his former employer than whether he is competing with him 
with the aid of his former employer’s trade secrets.”); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infra-
structure of High Technology Industrial Districts:  Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not 
to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 613 (1999) (explaining that covenants not to com-
pete are useful when trade secret protection is lacking). 
40 Gilson, supra note 39, at 613 (“Covenants not to compete are said to provide 
employers critical additional protection in Massachusetts precisely because trade secret 
protection of tacit knowledge is ineffective.”).  
41 This is not to say that the current law is optimal for West Virginia’s economy.  
See Gilson, supra note 39, at 606-09 (discussing the value of knowledge spillovers where 
restrictive covenants are unenforceable); see also ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON 
VALLEY:  ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 29-35 
(2003) (arguing that innovation is improved through sharing information). 
42 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,, 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). 
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federal courts may be a reasonable proxy for the sources to which 
West Virginia’s circuit courts might look.43 
Searches in Westlaw, Lexis, and PACER revealed more than 100 
opinions and orders that bore any relation to trade secrets.44  Howev-
er, many orders were not from misappropriation cases, but instead re-
lated to protective orders in discovery.  Others did not address any 
trade secret issues.  Thus, twenty opinions were trade secret misap-
propriation decisions, though some cases involved several issues.  
Another six considered trade secret issues, but not in misappropria-
tion cases.  These decisions were issued by district courts and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
While this sample is small, it is the entirety of the available data.  
There is no reason to believe that federal opinions that could not be 
located are any different than those that could be located.  The data is 
fully representative of West Virginia’s federal experience at the very 
least.  The application of this limited sample to other states is dis-
cussed below. 
B.  The Null Hypothesis 
While this study is only quasi-empirical, it is useful to identify the 
null hypothesis that one might try to reject.  The discussion above 
identifies two different assertions that could be tested: 
Hypothesis 1:  The UTSA is self-revealing, and lower courts need no appel-
late guidance in interpreting its terms. 
It may be that the UTSA is clear and unambiguous, and lower 
courts simply understand and apply it on its own terms.  Testing this 
hypothesis should not be difficult—courts either look to case law, or 
they do not.45 
Hypothesis 2:  In the absence of home-state law, lower courts do not look at 
sister-state UTSA precedents. 
This hypothesis is framed in the negative:  testing the UTSA re-
quires testing whether the uniform law changes the status quo as-
sumption that non-uniform laws do not allow courts to look to their 
 
43 See generally David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation 
in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 311-12 (2010) (discussing federal district courts’ 
citation of “persuasive” out-of-state authorities in trade secret cases). 
44 Full-text searches of unpublished cases dated back to 2003, with some earlier 
cases.  Complaints located in Westlaw and Lexis were used to identify which cases to 
manually search in PACER.  Search terms included “TRADE SECRET” and “MISAP-
PROP!”. 
45 Future testing might compare opinions from different states. 
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sister states for guidance.  It is more difficult to prove this hypothesis 
cleanly, as courts might very well look to sister states, even when inter-
preting non-uniform laws.  After all, many states did so before passage 
of the UTSA. 
Nonetheless, this hypothesis should be sufficient for the purposes 
of determining the role of the UTSA.  For example, given the UTSA, 
one would expect that lower courts would look to other UTSA states 
rather than Restatement states for guidance.  One might also test an 
alternative hypothesis:  that federal courts do look to sister-state UTSA 
precedent for guidance. 
III.  DATA ANALYSIS 
The case analysis reveals some surprises.  Unsurprisingly, Hypo-
thesis 1 is rejected:  West Virginia’s federal courts refer to case law to 
interpret the UTSA.  Surprisingly, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected:  
the cases that federal courts rely on are not sister-state UTSA opinions.  
Implications of these findings are discussed in Part IV. 
A.  Hypothesis 1 Is Rejected:  The UTSA Is Not Self-Revealing 
The cases quite clearly reveal a reliance on common law interpre-
tation of the UTSA by federal courts.  Out of the twenty-six court de-
terminations considered, only six were resolved without citation to 
some judicial authority somewhere.  This result is not surprising, as 
one might expect courts to routinely look to case law. 
The following table summarizes the issues and cases.  For each le-
gal issue, the table shows the number of federal court decisions consi-
dering the issue (N Opinions), how many of those decisions cite the 
statute (Cite Statute), how many cite case law (Cite Cases),46 how many 
cite both statutes and cases (Cite Both), and how many consider the 
issue in a proceeding unrelated to trade secret misappropriation (Col-
lateral).  The same opinion might have considered multiple issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 The source of these cases is discussed below. 
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Table 1:  Reliance on Case Law 
Issue N Opinions Cite Statute Cite Case(s) 
Cite 
Both 
Collateral 
Definition of  
Trade Secret 
1247 3 2 648 6 
Definition of  
Misappropriate 
349 0 1 1 0 
Injunction:  
Public Interest 
2 1 1 0 0 
Injunction: 
Irreparable Harm 
2 0 2 0 0 
Attorneys’ Fees 4 1 2 1 0 
Reasonable  
Precautions 
350 0 2 0 0 
Total 26 5 10 8 0 
 
Out of the twenty-six issues considered by various opinions, thir-
teen cited the statute and eighteen looked to some case law.  Five 
looked to the statute only, ten looked to cases only, eight cited both 
the statute and cases, and three looked to neither.51  Thus, about two-
thirds (69.2%) of the cases looked to authorities other than the statute. 
The null hypothesis that courts do not look to case law might lead 
to a range of expected citations to cases.  If the expected citations 
were 1%, then the z-score would be 34.97, significant to well below 
.0001.  If the expected citations were 20%, the z-score would be 6.27, 
which is still significant at the same level.  These results are sufficient 
to reject the hypothesis that courts do not look outside the statute un-
der any conceivable statistical test. 
 
47 One opinion cited neither the statute nor case law. 
48 One opinion also cited the Restatement definition after citing the statute. 
49 One opinion cited neither the statute nor case law. 
50 One opinion cited neither the statute nor case law. 
51 Of the twelve cases defining “trade secret,” one cited neither the statute nor 
case law, and one cited the Restatement definition after citing the statute.  Of the 
three cases defining “misappropriate,” one cited neither the statute nor case law; of the 
three cases citing “reasonable precautions,” one cited neither the statute nor case law.  
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These results indicate that the statute is not self-defining.  While 
there may be some issues that are more self-revealing than others, by 
and large, courts must interpret the statute and look to other deci-
sions that have done so. 
Of course, some judge, at some point in time, must have inter-
preted the statute without any precedent.  Of the precedents cited, 
nearly all were appellate cases, where multiple judges weighed in on 
the issue.  A couple of collateral cases relied primarily on other district 
court rulings relating to discovery orders, presumably because there 
are far fewer appellate opinions relating to discovery. 
While the conclusion that lower courts look for guidance appears 
robust, it is subject to a few limitations.  The first is potential bias in 
the data.  It may be that written opinions occur only in cases with 
more difficult trade secret issues; perhaps simple cases are disposed of 
without opinion or citation to case law.  Nonetheless, there is reason 
to doubt a bias.  Opinions were gathered from both published and 
unpublished federal district court dockets, and federal judges will of-
ten write opinions on the merits even for relatively clear claims.  For 
example, the data above includes one appellate opinion that cites the 
statute, but then affirms based on the district court’s analysis—a “sim-
ple” case but still with citation.  Further, two opinions excluded from 
the data are summary reviews of prior written opinions in the same 
case.  Neither case nor statute is cited in those “simple” reviews, but the 
lower court opinions reviewed do cite several cases.  There is no reason to 
believe that any unlocated or unreviewed rulings would exclude citation 
to case law; even jury instructions are based in part on case law.52 
Even if there were a bias, however, the conclusion still has merit:  
in difficult cases, the statute is not self-revealing and courts must look 
to other authorities.  This is still an important observation. 
A second potential limitation is whether one case dominated the 
results, for example, by citing many cases on many issues while other 
cases cited only the statute.  This is not a likely problem.  There were 
some cases that considered multiple issues, but on some issues only 
the statute was cited.  For other issues, the court cited cases only, or 
both statutes and cases.  In other words, courts appeared to refer to 
case law when deeming it necessary and did not refer to case law when 
it was apparently unnecessary. 
 
52 See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, §§ 4400–12 
(2010), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/civiljuryinstructions/ 
documents/caci_20091215.pdf (citing case law as a basis for trade secret jury instructions).  
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A third potential limitation is a selection effect.  For example, 
close cases may settle without an opinion at a greater frequency.  Ad-
ditionally, cases involving noncompetition agreements may settle 
more often.  Selection effects do not alter the findings here, as close 
cases would be expected to require more citation rather than less, 
strengthening the conclusion that courts must consider case precedent.  
Further, settled noncompetition agreements need not have an effect on 
the complexity of underlying issues one way or the other. 
A fourth potential limitation is whether West Virginia federal 
courts differ from other courts.  This concern is discussed in detail below. 
B.  Hypothesis 2 Cannot Be Rejected:  Courts Ignore Sister-State Law 
Somewhat surprisingly, the data does not warrant rejection of Hy-
pothesis 2.  While the decisions studied routinely cite to precedential au-
thorities, they do not consider sister-state opinions interpreting the UTSA. 
The following table summarizes the results.  For each legal issue, 
the table lists the number of decisions that cited a precedent (N Cit-
ing), the number of precedents cited (Precedents Cited), the number 
of such precedents that were state court authorities (State Precedent), 
and the number of authorities that were grounded in UTSA principles 
(UTSA Law).  For example, a state court precedent may not have 
been grounded in the UTSA or a federal court precedent may have 
been based on the UTSA. 
 
Table 2:  Consideration of Sister-State Authority 
Issue 
N 
Citing Precedents Cited State Precedent UTSA Law 
Definition of Trade Secret 8 31 8 6 
Definition of Misappropriate 2 2 0 0 
Injunction: Public Interest 1 1 0 0 
Injunction: Irreparable Harm 2 7 0 1 
Attorneys’ Fees 3 2 1 1 
Reasonable Precautions 2 4 1 1 
Total 18 47 10 9 
 
Of the forty-seven authorities cited, only ten were state court prece-
dents (21%), and only nine were UTSA-based precedents (19%).  Fur-
ther, there was no overlap:  none of the state court precedents was 
grounded in the UTSA and only federal court opinions relied on the UT-
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SA.  This result is not terribly surprising given that all of the state court 
precedents were from collateral cases decided in West Virginia—the fed-
eral decisions reviewed did not look to state court opinions of other states 
at all,53 so they could not have looked to UTSA-based state precedent. 
Some precedents failed to rely on the UTSA because they were is-
sued before the passage of the UTSA in the relevant jurisdiction.  
Other precedents failed to rely on the UTSA even though the UTSA 
was the prevailing law.  None of the West Virginia federal opinions 
studied explicitly discussed whether the precedent cited was based on 
the UTSA or not. 
If the null hypothesis is interpreted to mean that 1% of the prece-
dents cited are sister-state UTSA cases, the z-score is 12.5, which is sig-
nificant to a probability of .0001.  That is, the courts do sometimes cite 
to UTSA law.  However, if the null hypothesis is interpreted to mean 
that 20% of the precedents cited are sister-state UTSA cases, the z-
score is -0.14, which is not statistically significant.  As a result, the null 
hypothesis that courts do not look to sister-state UTSA cases can be re-
jected in its strictest form, but cannot be rejected under the more rea-
listic hypothesis that a court sitting in a state subject to the UTSA will 
cite to UTSA cases 20% of the time.54 
In fact, the alternative hypothesis—that courts do look to sister-
state UTSA cases 80% (or even 50%) of the time—would be rejected at 
the .0001 confidence level with respective z-scores of -10.42 and -4.23.  
While the studied courts seek guidance to interpret trade secret law, 
they do not do so by specially considering sister-state UTSA precedent. 
The above tests were for citation to any UTSA precedent, includ-
ing federal district and appellate court opinions.  If the tests were for 
state court UTSA precedent only, the result would be zero, not even 
meeting the 1% hypothesis level. 
One potential bias in the data is the citation of the same case mul-
tiple times.  This did occur with respect to one case, Tsapis, which was 
cited four times.  Tsapis accounts for nearly half of the state prece-
dents cited on any issue, but adds no UTSA-based precedents because 
it is not based on the UTSA.  Thus, multiple-citation bias is in favor of 
 
53 Many of the cited cases were from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit (which includes West Virginia) or from district courts within that cir-
cuit.  However, cases were cited from several other courts, such as the Courts of Appeal 
for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits. 
54 Even 20% is a relatively low percentage.  One might expect courts sitting in 
non-UTSA states to cite UTSA based precedent 20% of the time based solely on over-
lapping UTSA and Restatement legal principles.  A simple test of this hypothesis would 
be New York citations to case law from UTSA states. 
16 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1 
PENNumbra 
state court citation rather than against it.  Additionally, the bias fur-
ther illustrates the failure of the UTSA to guide decisionmaking.  As 
discussed above, when faced with a question about how to define 
trade secrets, the state court in Tsapis looked to non-UTSA law.  
Moreover, Tsapis accounts for only four of the forty-seven precedents, 
which does not substantially affect the conclusion that the decisions 
studied fail to cite state court or UTSA cases. 
A further potential bias is a difference between West Virginia fed-
eral courts and those of other states; this bias is discussed below. 
IV. A FAILURE OF UNIFORMITY? 
In many ways, West Virginia’s experience is not unique.  Many 
state courts will look to the decisions of other states for guidance.55  
This is, after all, the purpose of a uniform statute.  West Virginia ex-
tends the principle to the extreme, by applying only the laws of other 
states.  This allows the state to act as a de facto control group to test 
various aspects of the uniform law.  It appears, however, that the UT-
SA fails the test of uniformity because it is not being used as a source 
of case law precedent.  Instead, older common law is being used. 
A.  Non-Uniformity 
The West Virginia experience implies that the UTSA fails as a uni-
form source of precedent for sister states that adopt it.  When faced 
with a lack of home-state-court guidance, West Virginia federal courts 
look to out-of-state precedent based on the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, the primary source of trade secret common law.  Indeed, when 
faced with collateral trade secret questions, such as litigation discovery 
protective orders, West Virginia’s own Supreme Court also looked to 
non-UTSA precedent. 
As discussed above, one might argue that West Virginia courts are 
somehow different from other federal courts.  This potential source of 
bias seems unlikely for two reasons. 
First, there is no reason to believe that West Virginia federal 
judges are somehow less qualified to assess foreign precedent than 
other federal judges.  West Virginia district court judges are expe-
 
55 See Almeling, supra note 43, at 311-12 (finding that federal courts often cite to 
cases from other jurisdictions).  Almeling does not look at each precedent to deter-
mine whether the precedent is applying the UTSA. 
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rienced, their opinions reviewed were well-reasoned, and the prece-
dents they cite are factually analogous—just not based on the UTSA. 
Second, the non-UTSA cases cited in the opinions were them-
selves issued by federal courts in UTSA states.  While not every case 
fell into this category, enough did to imply that it is not only federal 
courts in West Virginia that apply non-UTSA common law.  Of course, 
a full study of other federal courts will answer the question. 
Third, there may be issues presented in cases from other states 
that were not addressed by West Virginia’s courts.  To the extent those 
issues related to legal issues unique to the UTSA, like “independent 
economic value” or whether a secret is “readily ascertainable,” courts 
of other states may rely on UTSA precedent to a greater degree than 
the decisions studied here.  Any further study must compare citations 
not only in the aggregate, but also with respect to each legal issue. 
Finally, the results of this study should not be overstated.  While it 
appears that the UTSA has not yet contributed to uniformity, the law 
may still provide uniformity.  Trade secret law has a long and rich his-
tory, including the Restatement of Torts.  While the UTSA was in-
tended to unify variable state laws, it may be that the Restatement 
principles still do so—at least in states with little state court precedent 
applying the UTSA. 
In fact, a likely reason for the observed citation pattern is that the 
litigating parties (or the courts themselves) seek out analogous factual 
patterns rather than UTSA-specific interpretations.  Because many 
analogous factual patterns may have arisen under the Restatement, 
courts will cite them.  The failure, if there is one, appears to be leaving 
out a discussion about why such factual patterns also apply under the 
UTSA.  This may reflect desire on the part of the parties of the litiga-
tion to rely on fact patterns or inexperience with the nuances of trade 
secret law.  While the UTSA purports to preempt the common law, 
drafters of uniform laws might be better served by explicitly identify-
ing the common law rules that are superseded by the statute.  The 
UTSA does, in fact, do this to some extent in the comments, but if in-
experience is the issue then statutory exclusions might be helpful. 
B.  The Role of Collateral Cases 
Finally, this analysis reinforces the assertion above that collateral 
cases are not the most helpful sources of trade secret law.  All three of 
the trade secret definition opinions that failed to cite the statute (or 
any authority at all) were collateral cases. 
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This result might mean that the UTSA is more self-revealing than 
the full set of opinions implies.  When collateral cases are excluded, 
the number of opinions citing just cases or both the statute and cases 
decreases by four.  Further, all the precedent cited in collateral cases 
is non-UTSA based.  This observation implies that in collateral cases, 
the UTSA does not adequately answer questions on its own and courts 
are not looking to UTSA judicial opinions to clarify the issues. 
However, this trend is little different than noncollateral cases 
where courts also failed to cite UTSA or state court precedent.  Thus, 
there is no reason to believe that federal courts are ignoring UTSA 
case law any more in collateral cases than they are in direct misappro-
priation actions. 
Nonetheless, the evidence implies that collateral cases are not a 
good basis for UTSA analysis.  For example, it may be that collateral 
cases can be properly decided without reference to the UTSA.  The 
collateral cases studied were nearly all related to the definition of a 
trade secret for issuing a protective order under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.56  While it might be preferable to use underlying state 
law to determine whether information is a trade secret deserving of 
protection in discovery, it is foreseeable that common law should be 
used to interpret what a “trade secret” is under the federal rules. 
This confirms that collateral cases should not be used as substan-
tive law precedent.  Tsapis, for example, was a protective order case, 
which followed non-UTSA federal law to define trade secrets, presum-
ably based on the reasons discussed here.  However, the case has since 
been used in noncollateral cases as a basis for defining trade secrets in 
a misappropriation action.  This failure to distinguish between colla-
teral and noncollateral cases leads to further non-uniformity. 
CONCLUSION 
This brief study has demonstrated an apparent failure of the UT-
SA to provide a uniform body of precedent to be used in all the states 
adopting it.  While the evidence presented here could be limited to 
just one state’s experience, at least some of the findings here will likely 
apply to some—if not many—other states.  This Essay is an introduc-
tion to an ongoing research project categorizing opinions from all 
UTSA states designed to extend this study’s findings. 
 
56 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (allowing for a protective order “requiring that a trade se-
cret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be 
revealed or be revealed only in a specified way”). 
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Future research also should consider whether the citation pattern 
described above is unique to federal courts—something that could 
not be tested in this study.  For example, federal courts might general-
ly cite to federal precedent that is not based on the UTSA, while state 
courts might cite to state precedent that is based on the UTSA.  If this 
were true, then federal courts may be creating federal common law 
based on the Restatement rather than the UTSA. 
More generally, this Essay provides the basis for further study of 
uniform laws in other legal areas.  By comparing the results of this 
study with analysis of other uniform laws, a more comprehensive pic-
ture of whether uniform statutes achieve the goal of providing uni-
form case law will emerge. 
At the very least, this study shows the importance of a state court’s 
interpretation of its own implementation of uniform statutes.  In this 
sense, the availability of uniform laws may have actually contributed to 
West Virginia’s nonreliance on the UTSA.  Because there was no in-
centive for locally developed jurisprudence, lower courts were left with 
uncertainty about the law.  Had there been some state court 
precedent, West Virginia’s federal courts would have surely looked to 
those precedents first.  The result may not have been uniformity with 
other states, but federal opinions would have been consistent with 
state law interpretation of the statute. 
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